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Surian sa mga Pag-aaral
Pangkaunlaran ng Pilipinas
n 2002, the proposed President's Budget esti-
mates the fiscal deficit of the national govern-
ment to reach P130 billion or 3.1 percent of
the gross national product (GNP). Considering the
spate of recent developments in the macroeconomic envi-
ronment, however, this target does not seem to be realistic
at this point. An analysis of the country's fiscal system also
reveals its incapacity to generate revenues. As such, in all
probability, a more realistic fiscal deficit would be much
higher than P130 billion.
Recently, however, the government appears to have
focused not so much on improving its revenue performance
and, thereby, reducing the deficit. Rather, a disproportion-
ate amount of energy seems to have been put into search-
ing for innovative and creative modes of financing the fiscal
deficit. A more careful examination of these new approaches
indicates that they have rendered the orthodox way of mea-
suring the fiscal deficit less meaningful. Thus, their evolu-
tion highlights the need for greater transparency in the fis-
cal accounts.
Why is this so? This Policy Notes looks at the nature
and process by which each one of these new financing forms
works, and explains the reasons.
[Creative] financing 101
Among the new forms of financing taken up by the
government in the past few years, this Notes will review the
following:
] arrearages and accounts payable,
] zero coupon bonds,
] securitization, and
] partnering with the private sector and GOCCs.
Arrearages and accounts payable. The build-up of
accounts payable was first brought to the public's attention
in 1998 when the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) estimated the value of outstanding accounts pay-
able to reach P151.1 billion as of the end of that year.
To appreciate the evolution of the accounts payable,
it is necessary to understand the relationship between ap-
__________
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Difference
Year Cash Obligation Obligation - % to
Cash Obligation
1990 218.10 220.54 2.45 1.11
1991 247.14 247.66 0.52 0.21
1992 258.68 256.95 -1.73 -0.67
1993 282.30 276.04 -6.25 -2.27
1994 319.87 327.77 7.89 2.41
1995 350.15 372.08 21.94 5.90
1996 404.19 416.14 11.95 2.87
1997 470.28 491.78 21.50 4.37
1998 512.50 537.43 24.94 4.64
1999 590.16 580.39 -9.78 -1.68
2000 648.97 682.46 33.49 4.91
2001 703.22 699.88 -3.34 -0.48





Difference = Obligation - Cash
Table 1. Reconciliation of the expenditure
program with the Cash Program (In Pbillion)
propriations and obligations as well as between the obliga-
tion expenditure program and the cash expenditure program.
The obligation program is simply the sum of current
appropriations (the one found in the General Appropriations
Act), continuing appropriations and automatic appropriations
(which include interest payments and the payment of retire-
ment and life insurance premiums of government employ-
ees). For instance, in 2002, the obligation program amounts
to P780.8 billion, broken down as follows: current appro-
priations (P419.6 billion) + continuing appropriations (P0) +
automatic appropriations (P361.2 billion).
Meanwhile, the cash expenditure program is obtained
by first subtracting unpaid obligations for the current year
from the obligation program and then adding payments for
prior years' accounts to the program. It is but normal that
some obligations for the current year would not require pay-
ment in the same year. This is so because the delivery of
the goods/services involved may not have been completed
in the current year or even if they were, billing may come in
after the end of the current year. Conversely, obligations in
previous years' accounts may require payment in the cur-
rent year.
In general, there is no one-to-one correspondence
between the obligation expenditure program and the cash
expenditure program. However, the difference between the
two is not large in a typical year. That is, unpaid obligations
for the current year and payments of prior years' accounts
tend to wash each other out. Moreover, if the difference is
large in one direction in any given year, it should go in the
other direction in the next year.
A look at Table 1, however, shows that between 1995-
1998, obligations have consistently exceeded cash expen-
ditures by substantial amounts. Moreover, one will note that
while the cumulative difference between the two was only
P2.6 billion in 1976-1989 (a period of 13 years), the differ-
ence was a huge P85.8 billion in 1990-1998, a period of
just eight years.1 A further examination of the figures shows
that in the period 1994-1997 when the government was
officially posting fiscal surpluses, the accounts payable were
rapidly building up.
Moreover, the difference between the obligation pro-
gram and the cash program in 2002 is P26.5 billion (or
3.4% of obligations) even as the national government pro-
fesses to retire P60 billion in accounts payable that were
incurred in the earlier years. These figures raise the possi-
bility that arrearages would once again figure in the financ-
ing of the fiscal deficit in 2002.
What is the implication of all these developments?
The primary problem with arrearages is that they do
not show up in the fiscal accounts and, thus, are not re-
flected in the fiscal deficit figures. As such, they diminish
the transparency of the fiscal accounts and make policy
analysis more difficult. The second is that although no ex-
plicit interest payments are made to private contractors and
__________
1It is recognized that the difference between commitments (or obli-
gations) and payments (or cash disbursement) may overestimate arrears
to the extent that goods/services contracted for in the current year may not
have been delivered in the same year and to the extent that the processing
of outstanding invoices require material time (usually referred to as the
"float"). However, if commitments consistently exceed payments for a




2From the perspective of the DBM, such action is considered dys-
functional. However, the implementing agencies consider the same as a
rational and appropriate reaction to the situation.
3This is a feature that is not shared by nonzero coupon bonds.
suppliers, anecdotal evidence indicates that most contrac-
tors and suppliers, including those who are not adversely
affected, adjust the prices they charge government upwards
to reflect the cost of money that they might have to shoul-
der because of delays in payment. In addition, when the
problem is particularly acute, some may even resort to brib-
ing the agencies concerned so as to be put on top of the
waiting list of arrears (Schiavo-Campo and Tommasi 1999).
And the third problem is that line agencies that have to deal
directly with government contractors and suppliers have been
observed to wait for the release of the notice of cash alloca-
tions (NCAs) prior to contracting out projects even if the
obligation authority is already with them.2
Zero coupon bonds. Recently, the Bureau of Treasury
issued 10-year zero coupon bonds (or 10-year zeroes) with
a face value of P35 billion. What are zero coupon bonds? It
is a debt instrument whereby the borrower (the government
in this instance) does not have to pay interest yearly for the
bonds issued. Instead, the investors' interest earnings are
imputed in the final payment and the government makes a
balloon payment equal to the face value of the zeroes at the
maturity date.
On their first issuance, these zeroes generated P10
billion in cash for the government. Ten years from now, the
government will in turn make a balloon payment of P35 bil-
lion.
On one hand, coupon bonds and other long-term bonds
issued by the government are important in helping estab-
lish a yield curve for the domestic bond market that is es-
sential to its development.
On the other hand, depending on how the interest
payments are treated in the fiscal accounts, zero coupon
bonds may create less pressure on the budget if interest
payments are recognized when they are disbursed rather
than when they accrue3 or if the interest payments that are
implicitly part of the balloon payment are not even recog-
nized as interest payments at all. As such, they may unduly
weaken fiscal discipline either by shifting the burden of the
interest payments to the future or by not recording the im-
plicit interest payments above the line as they accrue (and
therefore part of fiscal deficit) but rather below the line as
amortization payments.
And while the amount of the zero bonds issued—P35
billion—is not large enough at the moment to really make a
significant impact on the fiscal accounts, there are state-
ments attributed by the media to key fiscal managers that
suggest that zero coupon bonds may account for a substan-
tial portion of the national government's borrowing require-
ments in 2002.
Securitization. Many proposals have been raised in
various fora calling for the securitization of future earnings
from government assets (e.g., royalties that government
expects to receive from the Malampaya, Subic, Clark). Con-
trary to the impression that may have been created in many
public discussions, however, securitization does not provide
the government with income. It simply provides financing.
Securitization is therefore just another form of debt that
needs to be paid back in the future and on which interest is
paid. Thus, it does not reduce the fiscal deficit although it is
admittedly one way of financing the fiscal deficit.
In essence, securitization allows the government to
spend now the stream of income that it expects to earn in
the future from its assets by borrowing from the market with
said income stream as collateral. Securitization thus involves
the issuance of asset-backed financial instrument. In the
corporate sector, asset-backed securities are largely viewed
as an enhancement that enables them to obtain financing
at lower rates of interest. In this sense, securitization is the
same as collateralized borrowing. However, from the per-
spective of the government, it is not clear that such added
enhancement over and above the sovereign guarantee that
is normally applied to government debt would matter or is
necessary.
Partnering with the private sector (build-operate-
transfer schemes) and GOCCs. In the President's State-of-
the-Nation Address (SONA) last July, a number of programs
were mentioned as priority areas. However, the budget sup-
port found in the President's budget is not sufficient to fi-
nance many of these programs, e.g., infrastructure and
housing.4 December 2001
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In this regard, the present government proposes to
fund these programs from outside of the national govern-
ment budget. Two modes of financing are specifically men-
tioned. One is the build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme for
major infrastructure projects. Another involves the delega-
tion of the responsibility to government-owned and -controlled
corporations (GOCCs). For the latter, for instance, it is envi-
sioned that P20 billion can be raised from housing bonds to
be issued by Pag-ibig, the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and the Na-
tional Home Mortgage Finance Corporation. Part of the pro-
ceeds of the bonds will be used for housing subsidies to
the poor while the remainder will go to the development of
housing projects for those who can afford.
These two modes (BOT and partnering with GOCCs)
share a common feature. They both create contingent li-
abilities that government may have to shoulder in the fu-
ture. It is interesting to note that the contingent liabilities
associated with some BOT projects that were implemented
in the not-so-distant past have already been realized. One
example is the Metro Rail Transit (MRT) project for which
the government is shelling out some P3 billion yearly in 2001
and 2002. There is widespread agreement that the total
amount of outstanding contingent liabilities of the govern-
ment is large. However, these guarantees are not disclosed
in the national government accounting system. The amount
of guarantees in default are only shown as "contingent"
liabilities in the notes to the financial statements (SGV Con-
sulting and Cowater International, Inc. 1999).
In the case of the housing bonds, meanwhile, the con-
cerned GOCCs will surely be generating losses equal to the
subsidies that will be required for socialized housing. This
will then necessitate transfers from the national government
to the GOCCs in the near future. The question is: would it
not be better if only the pure market-type activities are as-
signed to the GOCCs so that the country will not experience
once again a return of an unmanageable GOCC sector that
was prevalent in the early 1980s?
Moreover, the designation of the SSS and GSIS as
issuers of the housing bonds raises additional questions.
Under normal circumstances, pension funds are the lend-
ers (not borrowers) in the long-term bond market since they
are precisely the institutions that have surplus long-term
funds. For instance, in Singapore and Malaysia, their pen-
sion funds are the largest investors in government securi-
ties. However, under the proposal, both the SSS and the
GSIS stand to lose money by borrowing (by issuing bonds)
at market rates and lending below market rates.
Eventually, these losses will have to be shouldered by
the national government or the members of the SSS and
GSIS themselves. A more prudent role for the SSS and GSIS
in housing finance is actually one where they buy or invest
in long-term bonds issued by the national government
(thereby matching the maturity structure of their assets with
that of their liabilities). In this manner, the viability of the
pension funds is not unnecessarily compromised.
Summary and conclusion
The hard budget constraint faced by the government
and the equally critical need to fund programs that will stimu-
late growth and promote poverty alleviation have focused
attention to the use of innovative forms of debt financing
like:
] arrearages or the build-up of accounts payable,
] zero coupon bonds,
] securitization of government assets, and
] partnering with the private sector and GOCCs.
The analysis suggests that these new forms of financ-
ing tend to make the conventional measure of the fiscal
deficit less reliable in showing the actual change in the
government's liabilities and fiscal sustainability. Thus, to
the extent that said measure is no longer able to provide a
realistic picture of the government's fiscal position, the use
of these new forms of financing suggests the need for a
more careful analysis of the fiscal accounts.  4